The Promulgation of Law

Gilbert Bailey

American Political Science Review, 1941, vol. 35, issue 6, 1059-1084

Abstract: “The impression of an inward principle,” asserted Thomas Aquinas, “is to natural things what the promulgation of law is to men; because law, by being promulgated, impresses on man a directive principle of human actions.” Promulgation is of the very essence of law, and a sine qua non of legal obligation. This is true both logically and historically.The very idea of obedience presupposes knowledge of that which is to be obeyed, without which knowledge there could be only the coincidence, never the obligation, of obedience. If human relationships are to be calculable, the people of a community must know, and know in advance, the rules by which they are to act and by which they may expect other men to act. Here is a proposition of such obvious force that any conception of legal obligation is almost bound to deal with it as an ethical obstruction to law enforcement which must be obviated by promulgation and a supplemental overall presumption that “everyone knows the law.”

Date: 1941
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