Congress and the Army: Appropriations1

Elias Huzar

American Political Science Review, 1943, vol. 37, issue 4, 661-676

Abstract: Both House and Senate have established separate legislative and appropriations committees and operate under rules designed to exclude legislation from money bills and to deny funds for purposes which Congress has not previously approved. The authorizations generally carry a maximum limitation which allows legislative committees to exercise continuing control and gives Congress some protection against its liberality, although in the two decades between the wars military authorizations ran considerably ahead of appropriations. The appropriations committees influence policy by determining which among authorized programs are to be supported and to what extent, as well as by incorporating “legislation” in Army supply bills, supposedly only when matters are urgent. They usually consult the military affairs and other committees affected, which may offer no criticism or may complain that their jurisdictions and the will of the house concerned have been disregarded. The objection is not merely one of formalities or competition for prestige, but has solid basis in the belief that legislative committees can give more thorough consideration to the implications of new policies than can appropriations committees. Within authorizations, authority over military appropriations is diffused, but control is pretty much by the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the War Department. Its precedence over the Senate committee results, inter alia, from its initiation and more detailed examination of money measures and the latter's self-confinement largely to the rôle of an appellate agency. And the full committee, divided for purposes of expertise and expedition, usually reviews its recommendations only sketchily and hastily.

Date: 1943
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