Distribution of Powers between an International Government and the Governments of National States

Arnold Brecht

American Political Science Review, 1943, vol. 37, issue 5, 862-872

Abstract: Universal feeling seems to converge upon the postulate that after this war an International Government shall be formed to control war and peace of the world, and that the United States shall take full share in it. This dual demand is considered a fundamental platform on which all men of good-will can meet. There is a far-spread tendency, however, to postpone inquiries into its exact meaning and implications. This vagueness may have merits for winning popular support. It has none in preparing for final action. It may even defeat the movement's purpose, because little may come from the longing for International Government, unless details are well prepared in advance. Or, built with a marble façade on shaky foundations, International Government may lead to disaster rather than avert it. None of the United Nations—at least none of the “Big Four”—has thus far given up its sovereignty. For this very reason, no insurmountable difficulty may lie in the way of continuing their alliance to some good purpose after the war, and gradually extending it to other nations. That is still a far cry, however, from the establishment of an International Government which, distinct from the governments of its constituent members, should have the power to take consequential steps independently. If we stake our hopes on this latter type, we must answer the question of how shall the powers be divided between the International Government and the governments of the national states? In passing through the immense flood of discussions on International Government, it is amazing to see how scant are the contributions to this question.

Date: 1943
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