Defective Methods of Legislation

Ernest Bruncken

American Political Science Review, 1909, vol. 3, issue 2, 167-179

Abstract: Frequent, emphatic, and apparently unanimous for many years, have been the complaints that there is too great an output of statutory law by the fifty-odd legislative bodies within the sovereignty of the United States. No less widespread are the charges that the majority of these statutes are unwise, ill-digested and badly drawn. Rarely, however, does one hear a remedy suggested, nor are the causes of these evils often subjected to analysis. The newspapers, to be sure, with their admirable capacity for passing judgment on all things at a moment's notice, without need of the slow process by which other people must arrive at conclusions, have long ago found both the cause and the cure. It would seem, according to most of them, that the cause is found in the preternatural wickedness and incapacity of the men elected to legislatures; while the remedy appears to lie in having just as few sessions as possible, and having the members hurry through their task with the greatest speed that is physically attainable. The public, having no other means of information, reflect the reportorial wisdom.This paper proposes to show that the true cause of the evil is found in the constitution and methods of our legislative bodies, by which a thorough discussion of proposed legislation, and a proper sifting of worthy bills out of the chaff, are made exceedingly difficult. If the cause is clearly understood, a point of vantage will have been gained from which reforms can be undertaken with reasonable hope of success.

Date: 1909
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