Executive-Legislative Federalism in West Germany

Peter H. Merkl

American Political Science Review, 1959, vol. 53, issue 3, 732-741

Abstract: The form of government which we call federalism can readily be illustrated with examples from history. Its institutional structure and constitutional intricacies, however, still present real difficulties of definition by logical construction and have given rise to many conflicting interpretations of the term. Kenneth C. Wheare, in one of the more recent attempts at general definition, describes the federal principle as the “coordinate division of powers” between the central and regional governments, which in their respective spheres are “mutually independent” and “coequally supreme.” Such language envisions a system in which both central and regional governments have a complete set of the three branches of government with full powers in their respective spheres of jurisdiction, and a minimum of institutional overlap or interdependence.

Date: 1959
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