Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902–1954*

Jack Sawyer and Duncan MacRae

American Political Science Review, 1962, vol. 56, issue 4, 936-946

Abstract: Since the theory of games was first made widely available, with application to economic behavior, its use has been suggested in many other areas, from the global to the individual. Several correspondences between game theory and certain aspects of political process have been noted. The contribution of game theory to substantive knowledge in the empirical sciences, however, has been modest; Luce and Raiffa judge that its impact has been greater in applied mathematics. The area of political behavior—despite the apparent applicability of the notion of conflict of interest—is similarly lacking in studies, although a few notable exceptions exist.

Date: 1962
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