The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals

Robert J. Sickels

American Political Science Review, 1965, vol. 59, issue 1, 100-104

Abstract: In some American courts of last resort, dissent is free and frequent; in others the judges vote unanimously for months, even for years at a time—a difference in judicial behavior which tempts inquiry and speculation. Although social scientists generally focus on dissenting courts and feed the human and scientific appetite for open controversy, the operation of every type of court is clarified by an examination of the ways and pitfalls of ostensible consensus among the judges. The purpose of this study of one supreme court and one body of law—zoning law in the Maryland Court of Appeals—is to demonstrate that under certain conditions unanimity in voting is illusory.

Date: 1965
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