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Party Choice and Support for Demagogues: An Experimental Examination*

Dean Jaros and Gene L. Mason

American Political Science Review, 1969, vol. 63, issue 1, 100-110

Abstract: The relationship of parties to democracy and to political stability has concerned scholars for years. Extant party systems have almost continually been under attack by reformers bent on achieving various objectives, among them greater party responsibility, greater honesty, and greater efficiency of governmental operation. But party systems have not suffered from a lack of defenders: reformers have often been engaged in vigorous debate. Such controversy, apart from the merits of the arguments on either side, focuses attention on a number of interesting empirical propositions about parties in democratic systems. These propositions, unfortunately, have not often been put to rigorous systematic test. For example, defenders of the American party system in particular point out that an important function of parties is the guiding of social conflict into moderate, non-revolutionary modes of expression. Attempts at reform, goes the argument, should be considered as to whether they might interfere with this beneficial function. Citizens are viewed as having inherent tendencies to perform destabilizing political acts or to vote for extremist political figures. Somehow, we are told, these citizens are restrained from indulging these immoderate predispositions by the party system. In a sense, the argument continues, parties save the great unwashed from themselves; all democrats should be thankful that they do and appreciate them for this service.

Date: 1969
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