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Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland*

Jerzy J. Wiatr

American Political Science Review, 1970, vol. 64, issue 4, 1239-1245

Abstract: Discussing the character of the Polish party system elsewhere, I have suggested a label of “hegemonic party system” for it, as well as for some other party systems based on similar principles. The hegemonic party systems stand mid-way between the mono-party systems and the dominant party systems as defined by Maurice Duverger. In an earlier paper written jointly with Rajni Kothari we have suggested the following typology of party systems: 1. Alternative party systems, where two or more political parties compete for political power with realistic chances of success; 2. Consensus party systems, where multi-partism does exist but one political party commands in a lasting way the loyalties of a predominant majority of the citizens and permanently runs the government; 3. Hegemonic party systems, where all the existing parties form a lasting coalition within which one of them is accepted as the leading force of the coalition; 4. Mono-party systems; 5. Suspended party systems, where political parties exist but are prevented from regulating political life by other forces (for instance, by the military); 6. Non-party systems, where the government is ideologically hostile toward the political parties as such and does not permit them to function. Quite obviously, this typology does not exclude mixed types of party systems. On the contrary, the very fact that in political life nothing is absolutely permanent leads to the emergence of transitory types of party systems.

Date: 1970
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