Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian Case*
Dennis L. Dresang
American Political Science Review, 1974, vol. 68, issue 4, 1605-1617
Abstract:
Ethnic groups argue that a certain proportion of administrative positions should be filled by their members. This concern assumes that a bureaucrat applies to his tasks the values and interests of his social background. Evidence from Zambia, a country in which ethnic and regional differences have been highly politicized, suggests that this assumption lacks empirical support. The fundamental guidelines that appear to shape administrative behavior in Zambia are the calculations of what must be done to achieve individual career advancement. Administrators are, in addition, constrained from pursuing parochial interests by the range of authority and discretion attached to their particular positions.Although bureaucrats do not appear to provide ideal representatives for ethnic interests, the ethnic composition of the most visible echelons of the government is of critical political significance. This is particularly evident in a country like Zambia where ethnically defined groups are contending for positions in the new postcolonial society. The symbols of power can be as important as power itself.
Date: 1974
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