Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence*

David H. Koehler

American Political Science Review, 1975, vol. 69, issue 3, 954-960

Abstract: Riker and Brams have demonstrated the paradox of vote trading (“… that rational trades by all members [may] make everyone worse off”). In so doing the authors indicate the existence of an apparent disequilibrium when vote trading occurs. I extend this latter point and prove that the preference conditions required for vote trading are the same as those which produce the cyclical majority; the conditions for vote trading and the cyclical majority are logically equivalent. The conclusion briefly indicates the impact of this finding with respect to the work of a number of other authors and gives some idea of the restrictions which would be required to eliminate vote trading among rational legislators.

Date: 1975
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