The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument*

Paul E. Meehl

American Political Science Review, 1977, vol. 71, issue 1, 11-30

Abstract: The probability that an individual's voting in a presidential election will determine the outcome being negligible, it is argued that participation is irrational if predicated on principles that are either egocentric or act-prospective. Voter participation, if rational, must rely on some over-arching principle that is (a) Sociotropic, (b) Axionomic, (c) Collective-distributive, and (d) Neutrofactual. A distinctively ethical component must be involved, such that all purely “economic,” “cost-benefit” models postulating selfish voter rationality are incoherent. The notion of “helping” to elect one's candidate is criticized and rejected unless formulated in a special way. An important pragmatic consequence of the analysis is that the idea (relied on by the two major parties) of “wasting one's vote” on a third party candidate is shown to be invalid or of more limited application than generally assumed. If a sizeable minority (e.g., college students) were educated to reject that argument, politics might be profoundly affected.

Date: 1977
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