Presidential Power versus Bureaucratic Intransigence: The Influence of the Nixon Administration on Welfare Policy*

Ronald Randall

American Political Science Review, 1979, vol. 73, issue 3, 795-810

Abstract: Many observers routinely assert the relative weakness of presidents before the bureaucracy. The research of this study, guided by a structuralist theory of organizations, provides evidence of the Nixon administration's power to change policy, even over the opposition of the bureaucracy, concerning the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. The study demonstrates that the management tools available to the president and top officials, when used adroitly, are more powerful than are generally presumed. That presidents can affix their indelible stamps on policy by short-circuiting the legislative process and dominating the bureaucracy is more than a remote possibility.

Date: 1979
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