A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism

Todd Sandler, John T. Tschirhart and Jon Cauley

American Political Science Review, 1983, vol. 77, issue 1, 36-54

Abstract: This article presents some “rational-actor” models that depict the negotiation process between terrorists and government policymakers for those incidents where hostages or property are seized and demands are issued. The models account for the objectives and constraints faced by both the terrorists and the policymakers. Uncertainty is introduced through probability constraints (i.e., chance constraints) requiring a specific likelihood of some event occurring. Implications are subsequently extracted from the comparative static analysis as the models' parameters are changed. The last part of the article presents a club theory analysis concerning the sharing of transnational commando forces.

Date: 1983
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