Welfare Consequences of the Six-Year Presidential Term Evaluated in the Context of a Model of the U.S. Economy

Henry Chappell and William R. Keech

American Political Science Review, 1983, vol. 77, issue 1, 75-91

Abstract: We evaluate the six-year presidential term proposal in the context of a model of the U.S. economy characterized by a short-run but not a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Votes and public welfare are separately conceptualized as functions of inflation and unemployment, which are indirectly controlled by the president through manipulation of government spending.In a series of simulation experiments, the vote-maximizing choice of policy instruments led to less we(fare loss with six- than with four-year terms under most conditions. Ironically, vote maximizing was shown to lead not only to short- and long-term welfare loss, but also to long-run political disadvantage.

Date: 1983
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