Partisan Intentions and Election Day Realities in the Congressional Redistricting Process

Richard Born

American Political Science Review, 1985, vol. 79, issue 2, 305-319

Abstract: Political scientists have done little to resolve the question of whether or not a state party's command of congressional redistricting leads to payoffs in its share of delegation seats. Studies on the topic differ in their conclusions while being marred by methodological shortcomings. In analyzing districting plans from 1952 to 1982, one finds that partisan control of redistricting does have the expected effect on seat outcomes, but only modestly. This relationship, though, has become even more tenuous over time. Since the imposition of the Supreme Court's “one man, one vote” mandates, the partisan gains intended by redistricting schemes have come to depend less heavily on the identity of the controlling party. And regardless of what is intended by redistricting architects, the electorate has become less willing to conform to their expectations, quite plausibly because of incumbents' growing ability to add residents of the new areas to their supporting coalition by election day.

Date: 1985
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