Class Compromises in Industrial Democracies

Marick F. Masters and John D. Robertson

American Political Science Review, 1988, vol. 82, issue 4, 1183-1201

Abstract: The stability of democracies has been of critical interest to students of comparative politics. One question that has received limited empirical analysis is, How do we integrate class conflict into the broader concept of democratic stability? We extend the work of Przeworski and Wallerstein. Our principal thesis is that as the material bases of class exchange diminish, the state intervenes economically to expand the resources conducive to class consent. A tripartite coalition thus emerges, with the state facilitating class compromise between labor and capital through economic policies. We explore this thesis in a cross-national analysis of data collected from 20 advanced industrial democracies during the time period 1965–83, and explore the essential conclusions and the political-economic implications of our findings.

Date: 1988
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