What Should Rational Cognitive Misers Do?
Iain McLean,
John M. Orbell and
Robyn M. Dawes
American Political Science Review, 1991, vol. 85, issue 4, 1417-1420
Abstract:
In the June 1991 issue of this Review John Orbell and Robyn Dawes have argued that prisoner's dilemma games are shaped, in part, by “cognitive misers”—players who assume other players are like themselves. In such games, this results in more play and in a higher expected payoff by cooperators than by defectors, lain McLean agrees with the conclusions of Orbell and Dawes but takes issue with their reasons and their model. In turn, Orbell and Dawes retort, arguing that players in prisoner's dilemma games do not respond as McLean assumes they will.
Date: 1991
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