Social Choice in a Representative Democracy

Jean-Pierre Benoît and Lewis A. Kornhauser

American Political Science Review, 1994, vol. 88, issue 1, 185-192

Abstract: Citizens of a representative democracy are twice removed from legislation. First, they do not deliberate and vote directly on legislation. Rather they elect assemblies that enact such legislation in their stead. Second, and less commonly remarked, citizens do not vote directly for assemblies. Rather they vote for individual candidates, with the candidates receiving the most votes elected. We examine the efficiency properties of these voting systems.

Date: 1994
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