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The Judicial Bulwark of the Constitution

Frank E. Melvin

American Political Science Review, 1914, vol. 8, issue 2, 167-203

Abstract: Few peculiarly American political devices have so perennial an interest, it seems, as our guardianship of the Constitution through the power of the judiciary. How unusually strong that interest is to day is well attested by the numerous examinations, chiefly within the past two years, of the sanctions for this much debated function. Especially significant is it, however, considering all that a long succession of legalists, historians, and political scientists have written upon the origin of judicial control, that so much fresh matter can be added to the elucidation of this problem. Yet it must be admitted that real contributions to various aspects of the topic may be found in the recent studies by Prof. A. C. McLaughlin, Prof. E. S. Corwin, Prof. C. A. Beard, Dr. C. G. Haines, and Mr. H. P. Dougherty, not forgetting also such late articles as those by Mr. Hampton L. Carson, Mr. C. H. Burr, Mr. Herbert Pope, Mr. W. M. Meigs and others.

Date: 1914
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