Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and Beyond

Robert E. Goodin

American Political Science Review, 1996, vol. 90, issue 2, 331-343

Abstract: Many bemoan divided government and the consequent deadlock of democracy. The logic of The Federalist arguably defends it, in ways heretofore unappreciated, by appeal to a least-common-denominator definition of the “public interest.” That quasi-Federalist logic is explored, and alternative political structures are assessed against the public interest criterion to which it appeals. Another and more defensible notion of the public interest is introduced, and its very different political styles, institutions, and policies are adduced.

Date: 1996
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