The “Veepstakes”: Strategic Choice in Presidential Running Mate Selection

Lee Sigelman and Paul J. Wahlbeck

American Political Science Review, 1997, vol. 91, issue 4, 855-864

Abstract: We examine the presidential nominees' choice of running mate in each election since 1940, when Franklin Roosevelt established a precedent by naming his own. To analyze the 22 choices made from the pool of 127 serious possibilities, we employ a discrete choice model. We find that the presidential nominee's choice is explained primarily by the size of the prospective vice president's state, by whether the running mate finalist was a rival for the nomination, and by the balance in age for the ticket.

Date: 1997
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