Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists

Henry E. Brady, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba

American Political Science Review, 1999, vol. 93, issue 1, 153-168

Abstract: A survey of the American public is used to model citizen political recruitment as a two-stage process. First, those who recruit others to become active in politics seek likely activists through “rational prospecting.” Second, they seek acquiescence to their requests. We model each part of the process, delineating the characteristics of individuals that make them attractive prospects and that make them likely to say “yes.” Recruiters who have information about, and leverage over, their targets are more likely to be successful. In seeking out people who would be likely not only to participate but also to participate effectively, rational prospectors select people with characteristics that are already overrepresented among participants. The net result of the recruitment process for political activity in general—and for financial contributions, in particular—is to exacerbate participatory stratification.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:01:p:153-168_21

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