Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House

Mark S. Hurwitz, Roger J. Moiles and David W. Rohde

American Political Science Review, 2001, vol. 95, issue 4, 911-922

Abstract: Distributive, informational, and partisan rationales provide contrasting accounts of legislative politics. Which of these theories best explains the decisions and policies of the House Agriculture Committee? We contend that all are appropriate, at various times, depending upon the particular issues and circumstances. By analyzing issues within the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Committee and the Agriculture and Rural Development Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee in the 104th House, we demonstrate that the issue environments of both are multidimensional (even within individual bills) and that each committee has both distributive and partisan policy dimensions. Therefore, it is impossible for either committee to be representative of the chamber on all its policy dimensions simultaneously. In addition, with regard to distributive issues salient to members, we find that both committees are homogeneous, high-demand outliers. Our study has important implications for distributive, informational, and partisan theories of legislative behavior and organization.

Date: 2001
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