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Appeasement in International Politics. By Stephen R. Rock. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000. 237p. $29.95

David Cortright

American Political Science Review, 2002, vol. 96, issue 1, 271-272

Abstract: Since Neville Chamberlain's concessions to Adolph Hitler in Munich in 1938, appeasement has become a term of disrepute. The word is almost an epithet, denoting weakness in the face of aggression. Generations of scholars and policymakers have learned the lesson that appeasement emboldens the aggressor and makes war more likely. Academic attention has focused instead on deterrence theory and the role of coercion and compellence as key elements of international politics.

Date: 2002
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