Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice. By Katja Weber. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 195p. $21.95

Jeffrey D. Berejikian

American Political Science Review, 2002, vol. 96, issue 2, 478-479

Abstract: While there are numerous examples of transaction cost analysis in the literature on international cooperation, little of this scholarship concentrates on military collaboration. Indeed, studies like Weber's that explain the varying density of military agreements are rare under any rubric. Weber's offering thus begins to fill an important void in the scholarship on military cooperation.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:96:y:2002:i:02:p:478-479_26

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in American Political Science Review from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().