Manipulating the Market: Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia. By David M. Rowe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 256p. $52.50

A. Cooper Drury

American Political Science Review, 2002, vol. 96, issue 4, 892-893

Abstract: One of the big questions concerning economic sanctions is why they so often fail. A widely accepted answer to this question argues that economic sanctions increase the political solidarity within the target nation because the targeted public rallies behind its leader in the face of external pressure (Johann Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics 19 [1967]: 378–416). David M. Rowe calls this explanation into question and shows that the unity behind the white regime in Rhodesia was politically constructed by the government and not a spontaneous rally effect generated by nationalism or racial unity.

Date: 2002
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