Rousseau on the People as Legislative Gatekeepers, Not Framers

Ethan Putterman

American Political Science Review, 2005, vol. 99, issue 1, 145-151

Abstract: Who drafts the laws in Rousseau's ideal state? According to John T. Scott it is the people alone who execute this function and Rousseau “does not positively argue that commissaires, magistrates, or anyone else has the power to propose laws.” Challenging this view, I argue that the philosopher's varied statements on the subject of lawgiving can be shown to establish merely a right by the people to participate in agenda-setting by others. Rousseau believes that the laws must reflect the will of the people but not necessarily through their physical writing, drafting, or framing of constitutional legislation. More important than popular agenda-setting is the majority's freedom to check those who do draft the laws. Amending my earlier argument that the sovereign is barred from legislating, I reveal how Rousseau's notion of self-legislation as “gatekeeping,” rather than agenda-setting, is central to the political theory and institutions of Du contrat social.

Date: 2005
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