EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Governmental Reorganization in Illinois1

John A. Fairlie

American Political Science Review, 1915, vol. 9, issue 2, 252-257

Abstract: In its broad outlines the state government of Illinois resembles that of most of the American States—but with the most recent tendencies as yet only slightly developed. The present state constitution, adopted in 1870, illustrates the political ideas prevalent in the middle of the nineteenth century—the election of all classes of public officials, the disintegration of the executive branch of the government, and the distrust of the legislature, and the provisions of this constitution are stereotyped by an amending article under which alterations have proved almost impossible. There has, however, been an increasing development of administrative authorities, created by statute, and added one to another with almost no attempt at systematic organization. From 1909 to 1913, there were not less than 34 new state offices, boards and commissions established, and the total number of such executive agencies is now approximately 130.Under the present arrangements, there is no correlation between related offices, and little or no effective supervision; there is no budget system and no adequate accounting system. As a result the public administration is inefficient and wasteful; it fails to furnish the general assembly with satisfactory advice on legislation; and there is no clearly defined responsibility for the conduct of public affairs; appropriations and expenditures have been rapidly increasing, the appropriations in 1913 for two years amounting to nearly $38,000,000.

Date: 1915
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:9:y:1915:i:02:p:252-257_01

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in American Political Science Review from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:9:y:1915:i:02:p:252-257_01