Counter-Productive Welfare Law

T. D. Campbell

British Journal of Political Science, 1981, vol. 11, issue 3, 331-350

Abstract: A standard criticism of the welfare state which is enjoying a resurgent popularity is that many of its operations are inefficient, even counter-productive, in relation to their assumed objectives. At the level of political and journalistic rhetoric it is asserted or implied that large sums of tax-payers' money are being spent in ways which benefit mainly the army of officials that administers them, and that much needless legislative effort goes into securing complexes of rights which serve only to provide work for tribunals and lawyers. At its most extreme the claim is that some welfare enactments actually cause more harm than good in that their intended beneficiaries would be better off without them.

Date: 1981
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