Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government

Thomas L. Gais, Mark A. Peterson and Jack L. Walker

British Journal of Political Science, 1984, vol. 14, issue 2, 161-185

Abstract: President Carter will perhaps be remembered most for his perceived incompetence, an impression produced largely by his inability to forge coalitions in Congress, and by his failure as an ‘outsider’ to intervene effectively in the established policy-making processes in Washington. In his farewell address, Carter alluded to what he believed to be the source of his troubles – the fragmentation of power and decision-making exploited by influential special interests. Carter believed that he was trapped in a web of organized groups allied with well-placed congressional and bureaucratic sympathizers seeking to protect their narrowly defined interests and frustrating his own broader vision of the public good.

Date: 1984
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