The Risks of a Reputation for Toughness: Strategy in Public Goods Provision Problems Modelled by Chicken Supergames

Hugh Ward

British Journal of Political Science, 1987, vol. 17, issue 1, 23-52

Abstract: In this article, versions of the n-person Chicken supergame are applied to the problem of public goods provision. The literature on two-person Chicken suggests that players should build a reputation for toughness in Chicken supergames by making, and sticking to, commitments not to co-operate. By doing this they are able to make the other player more likely to co-operate in future rounds of the game. However, in the n-person and continuous-strategy models examined here there may be risks associated with a reputation for toughness since, under certain conditions, other players are less likely to co-operate in future rounds of the game the greater your reputation for toughness. The implications of this are that the chances that vital public goods such as security and environmental stability will be provided may be reduced if players falsely generalize from the argument for maintaining a tough reputation in two-person, two-strategy chicken supergames.

Date: 1987
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