Groupthink and the Gulf Crisis

Steve A. Yetiv

British Journal of Political Science, 2003, vol. 33, issue 3, 419-442

Abstract: ‘Groupthink’ refers to a situation in which decision makers seek to achieve concurrence among group members more than to make calculated, carefully considered decisions. In this study, the theory is explored in the case of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis, with particular emphasis on President George Bush's inner circle. Using rare interviews and primary sources, it is revealed that some important conditions of the theory were present that affected how decisions were made, and it is explained theoretically why the outcome was none the less positive, contrary to what the theory would seem to predict.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:33:y:2003:i:03:p:419-442_00

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