Targeting Public Spending in a New Democracy: Evidence from South Korea

Hyeok Yong Kwon

British Journal of Political Science, 2005, vol. 35, issue 2, 321-341

Abstract: Empirical studies of electoral competition and public policy in new democracies have been relatively underdeveloped. This article investigates the election-policy outcome link in a ‘hard case’ setting: South Korea in 1988–97. Contrary to expectations derived from the bureaucratic insulation or fiscal co-ordination argument, this study suggests a systematic impact of electoral competition on levels and distributive patterns of public spending. The analysis finds that levels of government expenditure increased according to the electoral calendar. Also, national subsidies tended to be allocated to ‘swing’ provinces in which electoral contests are competitive. The results of the analysis clearly show that fiscal policies in democratizing Korea are to a significant extent determined by electoral politics.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:35:y:2005:i:02:p:321-341_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in British Journal of Political Science from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().