The Hidden Effects of Rules Not Broken: Career Paths, Institutional Rules and Anticipatory Exit in Legislatures

Kristin Kanthak

British Journal of Political Science, 2011, vol. 41, issue 4, 841-857

Abstract: Institutional rules that create winners and losers can also compel those who anticipate losing to quit that institution. In legislatures, these anticipatory exits have implications both for representation and our understanding of how seniority systems work. The current project constructs a model of anticipatory exit in which legislators who are not favoured under the rules leave, thus making room in the seniority queue for their more favoured colleagues. Empirical analysis of the US House of Representatives supports the model: Legislators most distant from their party are about as likely to run for higher office as they are to receive institutional power, whereas those most proximate to the party virtually never run for higher office and almost certainly receive a subcommittee chair.

Date: 2011
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