Profitable Participation: Technology Innovation as an Influence on the Ratification of Regulatory Treaties
Christopher Marcoux and
Johannes Urpelainen
British Journal of Political Science, 2014, vol. 44, issue 4, 903-936
Abstract:
What determines state participation in regulatory regimes? This article argues that if international regulation creates markets for new technologies, innovative companies support the ratification of the relevant regulatory treaties. Consequently, technological innovativeness should have a positive effect on regulatory treaty ratification. From the harmonization of telecommunication technology to pesticide regulation, many regulatory treaties create new product markets, so the argument applies to a variety of regulatory issues. This hypothesis is tested against data on the ratification of two major multilateral treaties for pesticide control: the 1998 Rotterdam Convention and the 2001 Stockholm Convention. Countries that are capable of biotechnology innovation are found to be more likely to ratify each treaty. The findings suggest that (1) technology innovation is key to regulatory treaty ratification and (2) constituency preferences for regulatory treaties are contingent upon expected profits from innovation. More broadly, the article emphasizes the importance of technological factors for international co-operation.
Date: 2014
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