The Effects of Malapportionment on Cabinet Inclusion: Subnational Evidence from India
British Journal of Political Science, 2018, vol. 48, issue 1, 69-89
Malapportionment doubly penalizes people from relatively large electoral districts or constituencies by under-representing them in the legislature and in the political executive or cabinet. The latter effect has not been studied. This article develops theoretical reasons for large constituency disadvantage in the cabinet formation process, and tests them using a new repeated cross-sectional dataset on elections and cabinet formation in Indiaâ€™s states, from 1977â€“2007. A one-standard-deviation increase in relative constituency size is associated with a 22 per cent fall in the probability of a constituencyâ€™s representative being in the cabinet. Malapportionment affects cabinet inclusion by causing large parties to focus on winning relatively small constituencies. These effects are likely to hold in parliamentary systems, and in other contexts where the legislature influences cabinet inclusion.
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