The Electoral Implications of Legislative Candidate Selection Democratization
Jorge M. Fernandes,
Alon Yakter,
Yael Shomer and
Gert-Jan Put
British Journal of Political Science, 2025, vol. 55, -
Abstract:
Amid declining public standing, many political parties seek to regain disaffected voters through various institutional strategies. One key approach is democratizing legislative candidate selection to grant party members or voters greater influence and signal improved responsiveness, transparency, and legitimacy. Yet does this strategy pay off electorally? The growing literature on this topic provides conflicting answers and limited evidence. We argue that more inclusive candidate selection does not have meaningful effects at the polls despite its merits. Whereas voters favor such procedures in principle, as some suggest, they underprioritize them in favor of other considerations when electing parties. We support this argument with observational and experimental data, including a matching difference-in-differences estimation of party performance across thirty-four democracies and a survey democracies and a survey experiment in three countries. This article contributes to our understanding of the relationship between party institutions and voter behavior in an age of eroding public trust and rising anti-establishment sentiment.
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:55:y:2025:i::p:-_125
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