Principled Pragmatism: Big Business and Campaign Contributions After January 6

Amy Meli and Florian Gawehns

British Journal of Political Science, 2025, vol. 55, -

Abstract: Corporations use financial contributions to gain access to influential policymakers. How do these actors respond when officeholders violate widely held norms, such as accepting the results of free and fair elections? We argue that businesses are sensitive to norm violations because they balance their economic interests with accountability demands from employees and other stakeholders. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that legislators who supported Donald Trump’s false claims about a ‘stolen election’ experienced a significant decline in contributions from Fortune 500 PACs in 2021 and 2022. Additionally, our analysis reveals that companies continue to contribute more to party leaders and members of key committees, consistent with our hypothesis. These findings suggest that corporations are willing to balance the interests of their two audiences by sending signals of disapproval towards those who violate established norms while continuing to lobby key lawmakers.

Date: 2025
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