The Hidden Cost of Tax Regressivity at the Top

David Hope, Julian Limberg and Lukas Haffert

British Journal of Political Science, 2026, vol. 56, e2

Abstract: How does tax regressivity at the top affect public support for taxation? In this article, we run an information provision experiment in the United States with a quota-representative sample of around 4,000 people and randomly present respondents with factual information about total tax rates by income group. We find that informing respondents that the superrich pay lower total tax rates than other people not only increases support for raising taxes on the rich but also lowers support for taxing the middle class. Our results highlight an important hidden cost of tax regressivity at the top: if left unaddressed, it risks undermining public support for broad-based taxation.

Date: 2026
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