The political economy of rationing health care in England and the US: the ‘accidental logics’ of political settlements

Gwyn Bevan and Lawrence D. Brown

Health Economics, Policy and Law, 2014, vol. 9, issue 3, 273-294

Abstract: This article considers how the ‘accidental logics’ of political settlements for the English National Health Service (NHS) and the Medicare and Medicaid programmes in the United States have resulted in different institutional arrangements and different implicit social contracts for rationing, which we define to be the denial of health care that is beneficial but is deemed to be too costly. This article argues that rationing is designed into the English NHS and designed out of US Medicare; and compares rationing for the elderly in the United States and in England for acute care, care at the end of life, and chronic care.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:hecopl:v:9:y:2014:i:03:p:273-294_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Health Economics, Policy and Law from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().