Selective Weighted Voting in the UN General Assembly: Rationale and Methods

Catherine Senf Manno

International Organization, 1966, vol. 20, issue 1, 37-62

Abstract: This article presents some alternative proposals for moderating the most extreme effects of the one-state, one-vote rule in the UN General Assembly by the selective application of weighted voting. Included is a brief summary of some results of an empirical analysis of General Assembly decision making that pointed to the kinds of decisions for which weighting is recommended. Several proposed formulas and the weights which result from them are more fully described and illustrated because of their novelty and their sometimes unexpected effects.

Date: 1966
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