Congressional oversight and the multilateral development banks

Jonathan Sanford and Margaret Goodman

International Organization, 1975, vol. 29, issue 4, 1055-1064

Abstract: The existence of quasi-sovereign international institutions raises important questions regarding the level of national influence and the degree of democratic control over international political decisions which can be exercised within a multilateral political framework. Karl Kaiser suggests that “as the number and activities of international organizations expand, an area grows in which major decisions are made without much democratic control by the peoples and institutions which are affected or which support these activities financially. Because the national government is still the basic unit of political organization in contemporary world politics, it is necessary that national governments oversee the operations of the international institutions if the principle of public control over those who make the major political decisions is to be retained. For oversight to be effective, and for the principle of public control over the makers of political decisions to be retained, oversight must be reinforced by sufficient access to information so that governments can regulate these institutions and so that citizens can control governments.

Date: 1975
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