Multinational alternatives and nuclear nonproliferation

Lawrence Scheinman

International Organization, 1981, vol. 35, issue 1, 77-102

Abstract: The use of multinational institutional arrangements to control sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities has interested policymakers since the dawn of the nuclear age. Several such ventures have been tried during the past several decades, largely for economic, commercial, or technical reasons, and they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. More recently, with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, multinational arrangements have received increasing attention as a means of reinforcing international safeguards which, together with political commitments on peaceful use, have been the principal components of the nonproliferation regime.The political acceptability and efficacy of multinational arrangements is related to the historic experience with multinational ventures, the changed political circumstances of the 1970s, and the probable requirements for constructive future cooperation. As part of a comprehensive regime covering the development of sensitive nuclear activities, multinational arrangements can reinforce the regime in a manner that is widely acceptable. A political effort to win support for such arrangements is thus worthwhile.

Date: 1981
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