Public goods and political institutions: trade and monetary policy processes in the United States

Joanne Gowa

International Organization, 1988, vol. 42, issue 1, 15-32

Abstract: Basic analytic premises are an issue in contemporary debates about the U.S. foreign economic policy process. In dispute are the power structures alleged to govern the formation of American trade and international monetary policy. Thus, the literature supports both of these assumptions: the distribution of power is skewed towards private actors in the issue-area generally; the distribution of power varies according to issue-area. Within the camp of issue-specific power structures, as I shall discuss in more detail, support can be found for almost any assumption about the distribution of power prevailing, in the language of current debate, between “state and society.”

Date: 1988
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