Disciplining trade finance: the OECD Export Credit Arrangement

Andrew M. Moravcsik

International Organization, 1989, vol. 43, issue 1, 173-205

Abstract: The salience of tariffs, quotas, and other import restrictions in current discussions of trade policy obscures what may well become a more significant form of government intervention: subsidized export promotion. Over the past two decades, subsidized trade finance has been one of the most widely used instruments of export promotion. This article offers an historical description and a theoretical explanation for the success of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Export Credit Arrangement, an international regime restricting the provision of subsidized trade finance. The explanation emphasizes three factors: the structure of government institutions, the relative power of states, and the functional value of information. More generally, the analysis demonstrates the inherent weaknesses of monocausal explanations of international cooperation and the advantages of explanations based on a conception of international cooperation as a multistage, process, each stage of which may be explained by a separate theory.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:intorg:v:43:y:1989:i:01:p:173-205_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Organization from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().