Oversight Hearings, Stakeholder Engagement, and Compliance in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Angie K. García Atehortúa

International Organization, 2024, vol. 78, issue 2, 293-320

Abstract: This paper introduces the concept of dialogic oversight, a process by which judicial bodies monitor compliance through a combination of mandated state reporting, third-party engagement, and supervision hearings. To assess the effectiveness of this strategy in the international arena, we evaluate the supervision hearings conducted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. We employ propensity-score matching, difference-in-difference estimators, and event-history models to analyze compliance with 1,878 reparation measures ordered by the Court between 1989 and 2019. We find that dialogic oversight has moderate but positive effects, increasing the probability of state compliance by about 3 percent per year (a substantial effect compared to the baseline rate of implementation). However, it requires the engagement of civil society to yield positive outcomes. Our framework connects related findings in distant literatures on constitutional law and international organizations.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:intorg:v:78:y:2024:i:2:p:293-320_4

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