EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Reviewing the United Nations Charter

Lawrence S. Finkelstein

International Organization, 1955, vol. 9, issue 2, 213-231

Abstract: The special provision in Article 109, paragraph 3, on review of the United Nations Charter resulted from the concern of many states that the five great powers, working in harness, would excessively dominate the organization. Most of the conference members at San Francisco resented the implication of permanent inferiority reflected in the great powers' special voting position in the Security Council. Although they feared that the Charter permitted too wide an application of the veto power, they nevertheless accepted it as necessary within limits.

Date: 1955
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:intorg:v:9:y:1955:i:02:p:213-231_02

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Organization from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:9:y:1955:i:02:p:213-231_02