The Incidence, Nature, and Implications of Price-Fixing Litigation in U.S. Food Industries

Leo Polopolus and James S. Wershow

Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 1978, vol. 10, issue 1, 1-7

Abstract: Antitrust laws generally seek to promote competition in U.S. markets. Alternatively, these laws attempt to correct the type of market failure that occurs when the market does not sustain price competition or embodies undesirable features, such as prices fixed and agreed upon by rival sellers. It is well known that the federal policy to curb price-fixing agreements was central to the enactment of the Sherman Act of 1890. Formal cartels of the 19th and early 20th centuries, with their sales quotas, exclusive sales agencies, price-fixing committees, and customer and geographic sales allocations, apparently have been eliminated from the contemporary scene. Despite the disappearance of United States based formal cartels, there has been considerable litigation in recent years over pricing behavior of individual firms. A wide array of agricultural and food industries have been involved in these actions.

Date: 1978
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