An Economic Analysis Of The Effectiveness of Thoroughbred Breeder/Owner Incentive Policies

J. Shannon Neibergs and Richard Thalheimer

Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 1999, vol. 31, issue 3, 581-592

Abstract: Thoroughbred incentive programs are subsidy policies funded from state parimutuel tax revenue designed to promote regional race horse breeding and ownership. At issue is an ongoing debate concerning the effectiveness of alternative policies. Empirical results indicate that incentive programs have a positive economic effect, but gains to Thoroughbred breeders can be obtained by reallocating tax revenue to non-restricted purses. A policy allocating tax revenue to non-restricted purses shifts yearling demand and increases prices, while breeder subsidies shift only the supply function and therefore lower prices. Consequently, breeder revenues increase in response to a policy that favors non-restricted purses over subsidies.

Date: 1999
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